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CULTURE AND EMOTION

BATJA MESQUITA[1] *and NICO H. FRIJDA*
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands

KLAUS R. SCHERER
University of Geneva
Switzerland

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Theoretical and Methodological Issues

Introduction

Interest in the relations between culture and emotion began in cultural anthropology. From the outset, anthropologists and ethnologists were struck by the cultural particularities in emotion manifestations, in issues of emotional concern, and in emotion lexicons. These diversities engendered theories regarding the cultural relativity of emotion and the powerful influence of cultural factors on human behavior. They also led to a dominant focus on finding evidence to support these convictions. The emphasis given to particularities of different cultures has been tied to the dominant anthropological methodology of extensive field studies in particular cultures. Direct observation and interviews with members of the culture were the main methods used (see Lutz & White, 1986, for a review). These studies have not provided a solid basis for actual comparison across cultures, nor were they meant to do so.

The anthropological approach is in contrast to the psychobiological approach that aimed its investigations at the possible existence of emotion universals. One of the first to systematically investigate this concept was Charles Darwin. In the process of collecting data for his pioneering volume, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872/1965), he sent questionnaires to correspondents all over the world to inquire into the patterns of emotional expression in their respective cultures. This research produced evidence for phylogenetic and ontogenetic continuity of major expressive behavior patterns. After a period of neglect, the writings of Tomkins (1962, 1963) inspired a renaissance of interest in emotion research. During this renaissance, Darwin's ideas were followed up by studies on the cross-cultural similarity of human facial expressions (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1973, 1974; Ekman, 1972,1973; Izard, 1971). Similarity in facial expressions of emotions was taken as evidence for the universality of a number of fundamental emotions, often referred to as basic emotions.

These two seemingly incompatible approaches inevitably led to vigorous controversies (Ekman, 1994a; Mead, 1975; Russell, 1994) in which one side advocated cultural origin and specificity, and the other cross-cultural universality of emotion. On the whole, the debate has not contributed to appreciable progress in cross-cultural emotion research. The reasons are multiple. The conflicting positions appeared fixed, not allowing for fruitful discussion. In addition, the positions were taken on the basis of limited evidence, often disregarding data that were not in agreement with the adopted perspective. Most notably, the psychobiological approach has focused on similarities in emotional phenomena, whereas proponents of culture-specificity concentrated on differences. Finally, lack of research progress in the domain was due to what we consider an unprofitable view of the nature of emotions.

In this chapter we portray a balanced view of cultural variations in emotions. To this end, we will discuss the evidence for both cultural universality and relativity in emotions. Our discussion will provide a general synthesis of the patterns of

the available research findings (for more exhaustive literature reviews see Lutz & White, 1986; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Thoits, 1989). We will base our review of the current state of the cross-cultural psychology of emotions on a model of emotions that allows for a finer comparison of emotions across cultures: a componential approach to emotions (see section on componential models).

Basic Emotions

Basic Emotion Theory

Until recently, most cross-cultural research on emotions was designed to test the hypothesis of basic emotions. Basic emotions were supposed to be a part of the human potential and, therefore, universal. The idea of basic emotions is not restricted to the contemporary psychology of emotions; it has held appeal throughout history (e.g., Descartes, 1647; Spinoza, 1677) and across cultures (e.g., Chari, 1990). Central to this concept of emotions is the notion that different emotions form independent and integral wholes in which various components (e.g., experience, facial expression, physiological response) are closely and invariably linked together. Each basic emotion, moreover, is presumably characterized by an unanalyzable quality of experience (Izard, 1977; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989).

One of the arguments in favor of basic emotions is that most languages possess limited sets of central emotion-labeling words, referring to a small number of commonly occurring emotions. Anger, fear, sadness, and joy are examples of such words in English. Most major languages have words that more or less clearly correspond to them (Russell, 1991). A second argument is based on research on the cross-cultural recognition of facial expressions and of antecedent events. The claim has been that basic emotions are marked by distinct and unique facial expressions, as well as by specific types of elicitors (see below for a more extensive discussion of literature).

The theory of basic emotions includes the hypothesis that all emotions derive from the limited set of basic emotions. Non-basic emotions are either seen as lower level specifications of higher order basic emotions in a hierarchical model of semantic categorization (Agnoli, Kirson, Wu, & Shaver, 1989; Boucher, 1979; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), or as blends of such basic emotions (Arnold, 1960, Plutchik, 1980). As an illustration, take the example of jealousy. A hierarchical model of emotions would cast jealousy as sadness (the basic emotion involved) specified by the antecedent of threat to a relationship. Alternatively, jealousy would be interpreted as a blend of anger, fear, and sadness.

Implications for Cross-Cultural Research on Emotions

The search for basic emotions has been influential in shaping contemporary cross-cultural psychology of emotions. It has influenced the questions research focused on. The assumptions of the theory of basic emotions were accepted without question for many years (e.g., Izard, 1980). Although these assumptions were often not explicitly stated by researchers, they have colored much of the research efforts, and they have often resulted in a biased perspective on the role of culture in emotions.

The theory of basic emotions has influenced cross-cultural emotion research in various ways. First, cross-cultural studies of emotion have limited the focus of research efforts to the question of whether emotions are cross-culturally similar or different. The possibility that emotions can simultaneously be similar in some respects, and different in others, has been largely overlooked. Thus, for example, some research questioned whether or not anger occurs in all cultures, rather than raising the question of the extent to which emotions in the class of anger are cross-culturally similar. Likewise, universal recognition of a particular facial expression as depicting anger does not rule out the possibility that the counterparts of anger in other cultures may be different on some response modalities or antecedents (see following discussion).

Second, the basic emotions approach has focused interest in cross-cultural research on the potential for certain emotions, rather than on their practice in the sense of prevalence or significance (see section on methodological issues). For example, studies on the facial expression of emotions have shown that people from different cultures recognize facial expressions in similar ways. The ability to show facial expression was then inferred from the ability to recognize. However, hardly any information has been obtained on the ecology, the actual occurrence, or the frequency of occurrence of these facial expressions. The basic emotions approach has fostered an interest in universal emotional potential, rather than emotional practice.[2] Obviously, both approaches are valid. The study of universal emotion potential looks at the capacities and constraints of emotion, whereas the study of actual emotional practice in concrete cultural settings focuses on the forces that mold emotional life. Thus, a broader view of emotions and emotional life is needed if we are to understand the cross-cultural variations.

Finally, the focus on the search for basic emotions has furthered a conceptualization of emotions as states rather than processes. When considering emotions as states, the interest is restricted to the phenomenology of those states and to stable emotion features. This perspective on emotions does not take into consideration that emotions generally unfold as a result of external conditions, which may change as the emotion develops, and thus, affect the nature of the emotion process. Among the most prevalent emotion elicitors are social interactions that, by their nature, develop over time. The display of emotions, including some involuntary traces of emotional states, may affect the course of social interactions. Further, emotions may also develop because, for example, the appraisal changes in focus. Social interactions and the "natural" development of emotional appraisals may be subject to cultural differences. None of these cultural differences in the course of emotions have received much attention from the cross-cultural psychology inspired by the notion of basic emotions. Attention to cultural variations in the development of emotions over time, and to the factors that contribute to such development, has thus been lacking.

In sum, for some time the notion of basic emotions has dominated cross-cultural research on emotions. As a consequence, (1) universality and culture-specificity of emotions have been treated as mutually exclusive, (2) the potential for emotional responses has been emphasized in cross-cultural research at the expense

of attention to emotional practice, and (3) cross-cultural differences in process characteristics of emotions, as well as in the embeddedness of emotion in social interaction, have been neglected in psychological research.

Recently, the area of culture and emotion has started to move beyond the issue of basic emotions. Both the concepts and the methods used in cross-cultural research of emotions have opened up to more complex questions rather than the limiting dichotomous view of whether or not the same emotions exist across cultures. In the next sections, we will discuss alternatives to the notion of basic emotions, indicating how they may affect the perspectives on universality and cultural specificity of emotion.

Componential Models of Emotions

Many investigators no longer consider emotions as unitary, elementary entities but, instead, view emotions as multi-componential phenomena (Frijda, 1986; Lang, 1977; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Scherer, 1984). Rather than assuming homogeneous emotional states, these authors underline the central importance of emotion processes consisting of concurrent changes in several different components. The emotion process is defined as a complex of changes in different subsystems of the organism's functioning. In an emotion, these subsystems (the components) are differentially elicited, and thus to some extent change independently of each other.

The emotion process, according to the componential views, generally includes the following components: a) antecedent event, b) emotional experience, c) appraisal, d) physiological change, e) change in action readiness, f) behavior, g) change in cognitive functioning and beliefs, and h) regulatory processes. Most emotion instances involve all of these components. Various components have certain independence; each has its particular determinants, in addition to the occurrence of an emotionally charged event. They also tend to influence one another; physiological change, for instance, is influenced by the vigor of the action one is ready for, or that one actually executes. The central idea in the componential approach is that different emotion components do not automatically follow from each other.

The implication for cross-cultural reseach is that each of these components may vary more or less independently from culture to culture. Therefore, if one is to establish cultural variations in emotions, each of the emotion components needs to be addressed individually. Or, to quote Shweder (1993): "To ask whether people are alike or different in their emotional functioning . . . is really to ask several more specific questions" (p. 425). Therefore, universality has to be established for components of emotion rather than for the emotion as a whole.

This is not to say that the different emotion components are completely independent of each other, or that all patterns of emotion components are equally likely to occur. One can argue that some emotional themes have universal significance in people's lives, because they reflect major contingencies of organism–environment interaction (Averill, 1994; Ekman, 1994b; Lazarus, 1991, 1994). For

example, across cultures, people encounter obstacles to the satisfaction of needs or the achievement of goals, and they face danger and personal loss. Equally universal are the major interaction patterns, approach or contact-enhancement, avoidance or flight, and antagonistic interaction or fight. It is plausible to assume that major appraisal outcomes and major interaction patterns, while not invariably linked together, maintain a non-arbitrary coherence. Thus, frustration in a very general sense is universal, and across cultures, it is often followed by antagonistic interaction, or a tendency thereof. At this very general level, certain patterns of appraisal and action readiness are, thus, more likely to be found than others.

Further, at a more concrete level, it has been proposed that there are universal patterns of appraisals and corresponding patterns of expression, autonomic arousal, behavioral tendencies, and feeling states. Scherer (1984, 1994) has used the term *modal emotions* to refer to these universal patterns. We will adopt this term, despite its inadvertent statistical connotation of being most frequent (whether the universal patterns referred to are also the most frequent in various cultures is, of course, an empirical question). An example of a modal emotion would be the combination of personal loss (as appraised) resulting in crying, withdrawal, and loss of interest in one's surroundings, with specific autonomic and facial responses. Likewise, in most cultures, harm inflicted by others will give rise to a desire to retribute this harm, by threats of aggression, and by facial expressions that we recognize as "angry." The existence of such modal emotions could account for the evidence for universal emotion patterns. It is important to highlight the central difference between the notions of modal emotions and of basic or fundamental emotions: the former does not assume a definite number of homogeneous, integral categories or mechanisms that justify an a priori definition of basic or fundamental emotions. Instead, the concept of modal emotions advocates the empirical study of the frequency with which certain patterns of appraisal, accompanied by typical changes in different components of emotion, occur.

The notion of a componential emotion analysis is useful for the purposes of this review of culture and emotion because it does not presuppose the existence of a limited number of universal, biologically defined emotions. Also, it encourages the empirical study of the impact of nature and culture on different components of the emotion process. On the other hand, it does acknowledge the presence of bunching, of fuzzy modal patterns with characteristic appraisal and response profiles and associated verbal labels, and thus, encourages the comparison of these modal patterns across cultures.

Methodological Issues in the Comparison of Emotions across Cultures

Emotion Words in Cross-Cultural Studies

In the cross-cultural study of emotions, the traditional point of departure has been the occurrence and meaning of emotion words. The questions addressed have been:

Do the major emotion concepts occur cross-culturally? For example, is the concept of "anger" general, or does it not exist in some cultures? If these concepts occur universally, to what extent do they refer to the same sets of phenomena? Do various "equivalents" or translations of "anger" mean the same; do they refer to the same experiences and behaviors?

There are equivalents for most of the emotion labels commonly considered to belong to the "basic" category in almost all of the major languages of the world. Russell (1991) concluded that "there is great similarity in emotion categories across different cultures and languages" (p. 444). Consistently, in most cross-cultural comparative studies of emotion experiences (Frijda, Markam, Sato & Wiers, 1995; Mauro, Sato & Tucker, 1992; Mesquita, in preparation; Scherer, Wallbott, Matsumoto & Kudoh, 1988, Scherer & Wallbott, 1994), researchers were in fact able to translate the English terms for the emotions under study into various languages. Subsequent research has further suggested that some of the emotion categories, which have lexical equivalents in all languages, are also among the most frequently used in many, if not all, cultures (Mesquita, in preparation; Van Goozen & Frijda, 1993). At a general level of meaning, these emotion categories are cross-culturally similar in that they refer to major forms of subject–environment contingencies or appraisal, and to major forms of subject–environment interaction or action readiness.

However, at the same time, it can be easily shown that there are also considerable differences in connotations, and occasionally in core meanings, of these terms. In other words, lexical equivalents in different languages are not necessarily linguistic equivalents. The term *lexical equivalents* refers to words used as each others' translation, as opposed to linguistic equivalents referring to words that are similar in meaning. Based on elaborate semantic analyses of emotion words from very different languages, Wierzbicka (1992) concluded that, "in fact there are no emotion terms which can be matched neatly across language and culture boundaries, there are no universal emotion concepts lexicalised in all languages of the world" (p. 287). Some careful studies have shown important differences even between the semantic fields of such closely related languages as German and Swiss German (Dünker, 1979).

Methods have been developed that yield insight into the correspondences and differences in the meaning of emotion terms; differences in quality and degree can now be compared systematically. Wierzbicka (1986; 1992; 1994) presented analyses that make use of a set of semantic primitives, presumably occurring universally, to describe the meaning of emotion terms across languages. The multicomponential approach to emotions opens the same possibility to empirical research. It compares emotion words by having subjects from different cultural groups describe the patterns of components of emotion incidents, for example, incidents of anger (e.g., Frijda et al., 1995; Mauro et al., 1992; Scherer & Walbott, 1994). Both Wierzbicka's analyses and the componential approach have found that, in addition to a shared core pattern of components, differences exist with regard to all components (Frijda et al, 1995; Mesquita, in preparation; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994).

Not only may the meaning of lexically equivalent words differ to some extent, but emotion taxonomies of given languages contain emotion words that, in other languages, are not matched by even remotely similar emotion concepts (e.g., Gerber, 1985). Also, taxonomies may differ drastically, and the emotion domain can occasionally be subdivided in such a way that the major categories mentioned earlier do not appear (e.g., Levy, 1973, 1984).

In the discussion of emotion words, however, it is important to keep in mind that the activity of labeling is independent of the emotion process and of the emotional experience as a whole. It is, to some degree, an arbitrary decision as to which aspects of the emotion process are selected and labeled by a word in a language; it depends on the communicative intentions of the language users and on the social focus of emotion talk (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990). It is often possible to understand emotion words from other languages, even if one's own language lacks a counterpart (e.g., Oatley, 1991). The reason is that the emotion words can be analyzed in terms of components that are familiar across cultures.

It is important to note that the absence of a specific emotion label in one or more languages does not establish the absence of a corresponding, frequently occurring pattern of appraisal results with respective componential response patterning. There is no evidence that the emotion lexicon is a better indication of occurrence and distribution of emotions in a given culture than other forms of emotion talk such as idioms and descriptions of valenced attributes of people and objects (Besnier, 1995; Briggs, 1995).

Reference Points

All cross-cultural research needs reference points, that is, bases or standards to which comparisons can be made. What is it exactly that is compared in cross-cultural emotion research? If the emotion words in different languages do not mean quite the same thing, then what can be the basis of comparison?

In line with the componential view of emotions, we think that the basis of comparison is formed by the individual emotion components. One can compare the occurrence and precise nature of various components, such as subjective experience, appraisals, action tendencies, expressions, and other modes of behavior. Alternatively, one can compare combinations of various components, such as the antecedents giving rise to particular response modes, the meanings attached to particular modes of response, the patterns of responses, and so forth.

Emotion words can be a fruitful starting point for cross-cultural comparisons of emotion, provided that their elements of meaning which are used as points of reference are explicitly stated. Such correspondence with regard to particular components of the emotion words to be compared renders comparison in other regards meaningful. It is meaningful to compare anger (English) and, for instance, *song* in the Ifaluk language (Lutz, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1988), because they both refer to emotions involving appraisal of harm from an animate agent; or to quote Wierzbicka (1994), both emotions involve the appraisal that "this person did something bad" (p. 138). They can then be found to differ in the kind of action they bring about. Anger leads to the tendency to return the other person's harm. *Song*,

on the other hand, produces action that aims to alter the behavior of the offending person; such action may include aggressive behaviors, but it may also consist of such things as refusing to eat and attempted suicide. It is equally meaningful to compare shame (English) and *a'ar* (Arabic), because they both refer to norm transgression as experienced, and to some form of submissive action tendency. At the same time, one can assert or examine the considerable differences in structure and meaning of the two emotions in each set, differences that may be decisive for the roles of the emotions in the experience of the individual and in the social interaction (cf. Abu-Lughod, 1986; Goffman, 1982; Peristiany, 1965; Scheff, 1988)

This does not deny the fact that serious problems of comparison and interpretation may arise when using emotion words. How does one determine whether differences in the phenomena associated with particular emotion words are due to semantic differences or to psychological differences? For instance, when finding that different phenomena are connected to shame (English) and *lek* (its lexical equivalent in Balinese; Geertz, 1973), we do not know whether this is because the word meanings differ or because the psychological structures of emotion components in comparable contexts differ.

For this reason, it may often be preferable to inquire into similarities and differences in regard to particular components of the emotion process, and in the relations that may exist between these components. The components as such are then used as the standards of comparison. Examples of the use of such alternative points of reference are studies that investigate the association of specific facial expressions with particular antecedent events or stories (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Haidt & Keltner, 1995). Another promising approach is one focusing on particular appraisal components. For instance, a study by Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, and Norasakkunkuit (in press) compared the antecedent events generated by Japanese and American subjects, when asked to describe an event that had enhanced or decreased self-esteem. The appraisal of "changed self-esteem" was used as a standard of comparison in this example. A final productive approach has been to cross-culturally compare the emotional responses to various types of antecedent events, such as "offense by an intimate other" (Mesquita, in preparation). Such alternative standards of comparison render the results of comparative emotion research transparent, and are, in fact, no more difficult to apply than emotion words.

Potential for Emotions versus Emotional Practice

We have consistently distinguished between the potential for certain types of psychological functions or behaviors, and their actual occurrence or practice in social settings. Potentials depend on the existing psychobiological structures and innately determined neurophysiological connections. They also depend on learning and socialization patterns that make certain cognitive representations available or provide behavioral models. Practice is determined by complex sets of forces in concrete cultural settings—including values, norms, habits, ecological presses, and opportunities—to make certain types of psychological processes and behaviors

more likely to occur (or more accessible).[3] It is likely, therefore, that emotional practice does not exhaust the potential provided by available emotion mechanisms. Given the cultural differences in the forces that push practice into certain directions, one can assume that while the psychobiological potential is more or less universal, emotional practice may vary widely across cultures.

As previously mentioned, cross-cultural emotion research has predominantly focused on the potential for certain emotions, while ignoring the practice of these emotions in different cultures. It has tried to find an answer to the question of whether particular emotions or patterns of emotional responses occur cross-culturally. Neither the frequency with which these emotions or emotional patterns occur in different cultures, nor their significance or focality to the culture, has drawn much attention. Most likely, the use of emotion words as standards of comparison has contributed to this neglect of the practice of emotions. The emotional phenomena compared were often those related to English emotion words and their lexical equivalents in other languages. To what extent these phenomena in other cultures share the frequency and significance they have in English-speaking culture has not been subjected to much study. In psychology, research addressing the relative significance of emotional phenomena in different cultures is scarce.

In contrast, many ethnographers have centered their work around cultural practices of emotion. They have concentrated on describing the prevalence with which certain emotional responses occur in a given culture in general, or else in particular cultural contexts (Abu-Lughod, 1986, Briggs, 1970; Levy, 1973; Lutz, 1988; Miller, 1993; Rosaldo, 1980). They have also described the combinations of emotional responses one is most likely to encounter in a given culture as well as those that are strikingly absent (to a Western researcher). And finally, they have focused on the specific contexts in which emotions or particular emotional responses are most likely to occur. Their descriptions have convincingly demonstrated that there are cultural differences in the ecology of emotions. Take, for example, the Utku Inuit culture, where anger is nearly absent. Judged by the ethnographer's account (Briggs, 1970), the only exceptions were anger towards a person who was being ostracized, and thus was no longer considered a part of the community, or anger towards dogs (aggression was apparently vented on dogs). Another example can be seen in the emotion of *hasham* of the 'Awlad Ali Bedouins, an instance of the category of shame that was seemingly omnipresent, and toward which many social rules and behaviors were geared. People reported this emotion upon damage to their honor, and the loss of autonomy. Even the slightest threat to autonomy was seen as such damage. The 'Awlad Ali were constantly engaged in attempts to avoid violations of their autonomy (Abu-Lughod, 1986). Hasham is thus an emotion that dominated the lives of the 'Awlad Ali. More examples of differences in ecology can be found in the sections addressing the individual components of emotions. At this point, it is worth noting that the ecology of emotions is a subject worth studying in and of itself. Emotion ecologies are thus among those dimensions that can be compared in cross-cultural research on emotion. Emotion ecologies also seem to have some relevance at the level of the individual's emotions (see section on the meaning of culture).

Level of Description

The last issue in the context of cross-cultural comparison of emotion is the level of description of emotional phenomena. As will become clear in the remainder of this chapter, emotional phenomena have been described at various levels of abstraction. Generally speaking, cultural differences in emotional phenomena tend to become more numerous and larger, as the level of description gets more concrete. So, for example, "thin ice" has been described as a major source of fear for the Utku Inuit, who live in an environment where the quality of ice is of vital importance (Briggs, 1970). At this level of concreteness, one could speak of a culture-specific antecedent of fear. However, described in a more general way, as an instance of physical danger, the antecedent evidently looses its specificity. This example illustrates how the very same phenomena may be considered either cross-culturally similar or cross-culturally different, depending on the level of abstraction chosen for description. Ample illustrations will be given in the discussion of the literature that follows.

The Meaning of Culture to Emotion Research

The term "culture" (as in "cross-cultural studies") is generally used in a rather loose manner. A definition of culture is rarely given in comparative research on emotions. Because of this ambiguity, not much attention has been given to the comparability of the samples (see Van de Vijver & Leung, this *Handbook*). Culture has too often been associated with national boundaries, resulting in too little attention to the emotional differences within nations (or between "subcultures"). In fact, it would be useful to study subcultural differences within any one culture, in order to evaluate the importance of cross-cultural differences relative to intra-cultural differences.

Related to the ambiguity of the notion of "culture" is a general vagueness on what aspects of culture determine the cross-cultural differences in emotions. To face this issue in a systematic fashion would require a grid specifying the relevant dimensions along which cultures vary. The work on value dimensions, such as individualism–collectivism (Kagitcibasi, Volume 3 of this *Handbook*; Triandis, 1994; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988), power distance, masculinity–femininity and uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1980) represents a promising beginning. But the dimensions need elaboration. Schwartz and colleagues have established a finer grid of cultural dimensions constituted of different value domains (Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 1995; Smith & Schwartz, Volume 3 of this *Handbook*). Examples of value domains are power, hedonism, achievement, and tradition. This work has shown that relations between various value domains are similar across cultures; there is thus reason to speak of a universal grid. It seems that cultures vary on their value priorities but very little on the way they represent the order of different values.

Cultural differences in value priorities have rarely been related to variations in emotions (but see Matsumoto, 1989), and equally scarce have been the attempts to theoretically clarify the relations between value priorities and emotions (a

rudimentary explanation of the kind can be found in Triandis, 1994). More generally, research on the way in which cultural traits impact upon the emotional life of the individuals is scarce and scattered. Anthropological and historical work has discussed different "emotionologies." An emotionology is a culture's lore about emotions (Hochschild, 1979, 1983; Lutz, 1987; Stearns & Stearns, 1985). Supposedly included in these emotionologies are rules about how to feel (so-called feeling rules) and about how to display one's emotions (so-called display rules). These rules have been assumed to govern an individual's emotions, that is, they re-model initial emotional impulses following cultural ideals. This widely propagated idea thus implies that the cultural modeling of emotions is mostly a secondary impulse. It is likely that such influence on emotions exists. However, the concept of emotionology has failed to explain how feeling rules and display rules are formed. Furthermore, emotionologies are unlikely to be the only determinants of cultural variation in emotions.

The influence of culture on emotions can be more direct. Convergent models have been proposed that describe the direct effect of culturally significant themes on the emotions of individuals from that culture.[4] It should be clear from the outset that the empirical evidence for these models is still very sketchy. For a better understanding of cultural variations in emotions, the effort to relate cultural events to individual emotions needs to be pursued.

One recent research direction suggests that cultures have "core cultural ideas" (Markus & Kitayama, 1994a, p. 341–343), that is, culturally defined and promulgated issues of concern. Cultures vary with respect to the ideas they make salient. Obedience and tradition appear to be salient in some cultures, whereas autonomy and originality are salient in others. It is possible that what is called core cultural ideas or concerns in this research tradition can be assimilated to what is referred to as high priority values in the value literature.[5] Thus, while the precise ideas that are salient vary from culture to culture, every culture does seem to have certain concerns that are focal. According to Markus & Kitayama (1994a), preoccupation with the concerns can be seen at all levels of the culture: the collective reality (ecological, economic, and sociopolitical factors), socio-psychological processes (customs, norms, institutions), and the individual reality (recurrent episodes in the local worlds of individuals). All institutions and practices within a culture gear the individual to these core ideas. Culture thus emphasizes focal concerns in all possible ways. Core cultural ideas are likely to be highly salient to the individual, because one is constantly exposed to them. Furthermore, constant cultural emphasis on a concern renders "cultural expertise" on that concern likely.

Individuals of a culture are likely to adopt these highly salient core cultural ideas as concerns. Culturally focal concerns will be so accessible to the individual that they are likely to come to mind when appraising an event. These concerns will be, what has been called, "chronically accessible" (cf. Higgins, 1989). That means that many events will be evaluated in terms of the concerns inspired by core cultural ideas. Anthropological evidence also suggests this to be the case (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1986; Rosaldo, 1980).

Furthermore, cultural expertise on the concern and situations affecting it will give the individual a sense of certainty when appraising the event. There is some evidence suggesting that individuals feel more certain about the meaning of events related to focal concerns, as opposed to events that are less focal; clear norms exist on how to interpret the former and how to respond to them (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Mesquita, in preparation). Clarity about the meaning of the event, in turn, appears to make the events related to focal concerns, as well as the subsequent emotional responses more obvious to the individual (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Mesquita, in preparation). Obviousness refers to a sense on the part of an individual that the emotional reaction to the event is imposed by the event rather than caused by subjective assessment or behavioral preferences. Obviousness of particular components of emotions is likely to exclude their being reconsidered and put into question, because alternative interpretations of the situation or alternative reactions are inconceivable. High accessibility of a concern will lead to a more frequent use of that concern in appraising events, and obviousness of the concern will lead to less reconsideration of its use. It can be maintained, therefore, that both high accessibility and obviousness themselves contribute to the cultural focality of the concern. And so do all the cultural manifestations of the concern, because they increase the visibility, and thus the salience, of the concern.

Not only do the concerns derived from core cultural ideas become highly accessible, but also the related emotional responses themselves may become habitual or even scripted. Therefore, emotional tendencies that are in line with the core cultural ideas may be formed. These emotional inclinations of the individual will conform to cultural practices (Abu-Lughod, 1986; Briggs, 1970; Kitayama & Markus, 1994; Shweder & Much, 1987). Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, and Norasakkunkuit (in press) have provided a good example of such a case. Japanese and American university students were asked to list events that had either "decreased or increased their self-esteem." Two hundred esteem-decreasing and 200 esteem-increasing events were randomly selected for a questionnaire with the restriction to hold constant the number of Japanese and American events in each of these categories. Different groups of American and Japanese university students were asked to judge the extent to which each of the events would affect their self-esteem. Both American and Japanese students deemed the American emotion antecedents to be more self enhancing, and the Japanese emotion antecedents more self diminishing, suggesting differences in the ecology of events. Moreover, Japanese students, on the whole, reported more loss of self-esteem than American students for the negative emotional events and less gain in self-esteem for the positive emotional events. The results thus suggest that the cultural differences in the types of events conform to cultural differences in the sensitivity to emotional events.

Various ethnographies have shown how major emotional themes in specific cultures dominate both the social life and the emotional experiences of individuals from that culture. Examples are Abu-Lughod's ethnography (1986) on Egyptian Bedouins that concentrated on *hasham* (translated as shame), and Rosaldo's ethnography (1980) on the Phillipine Ilongot focusing on the emotion of *liget* (trans-

lated as anger). *Hasham* and *liget* are focal emotions in the respective cultures for which they were described; they were talked about frequently; constant attention was drawn to situations relevant to those emotions; and the organization of social life was geared to steering those emotions in socially acceptable directions, either by avoiding them or by giving them shape in a socially acceptable manner. The cultural emphasis placed on these emotions is incomparable to the one placed on the emotions of shame and anger in English-speaking cultures. Ethnographies appear to support the supposed effects of focality on an individual's emotions, and so does some scattered evidence in other research.

In sum, to understand a cultural perspective, we must consider that cultural variations in emotion are relative to the cultural orientations from which they derive. Furthermore, the focal concerns of the culture must be taken into account and must be related to the conditions under which emotions emerge, as well as to the emotional responses themselves.

Cultural Variation in the Components of the Emotion Process

Antecedents of Emotion

Straightforward as it may seem, defining antecedent events of emotions is difficult. More often than not, the interpretation of what happens constitutes the eliciting event, rather than what actually happens. What makes an insulting remark an elicitor of anger is not the sounds uttered by the other person, but rather the meaning conveyed by these sounds and the interpretation of the utterance as obstructive and intended to hurt or humiliate. Cross-cultural research on emotion has been only marginally successful in finding a meaningful way to describe antecedent events. Different studies have described events at different levels of abstraction (see the example of "thin ice" used earlier). Conclusions about cultural variations in emotion antecedents have differed accordingly, with descriptions of highly abstract events yielding the most similarities across cultures, and concrete descriptions yielding the most differences.

Cross-cultural variations in antecedent events have been studied in different ways. The most frequent research question has been whether similar events cross-culturally give rise to the same emotional responses and, if so, to what degree. There has also been some research on the frequency with which particular events actually take place, as well as on the relative significance of these events in the emotional lives of people from different cultures. Next, we will discuss some instructive evidence in this regard.

Similarities in Antecedent Events

Research suggesting similarities in antecedent events, which elicit certain emotions, has been reported by Boucher and Brandt (1981; Brandt & Boucher, 1985). The research employed a recognition task. Subjects from different cultures (Ameri-

can and Malaysian in the first study and American, Korean, and Samoan in the second) described situations in which one person caused another to feel anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, or surprise. In the first study, a separate group of American subjects was asked to identify which of the situations mentioned by the Malaysian and American subjects had led to which of these six emotions; in the second study, subjects of all three cultures were asked to identify antecedent events of American, Korean, and Samoan origin. In both studies, 65 percent or more of the emotion antecedents were recognized. Subjects did not recognize the antecedents from their own culture any better than the antecedents from the other culture(s). The studies strongly suggest that the same events elicit similar emotions regardless of culture. Unfortunately, no information was given regarding the types of events that, in all cultures, were most readily recognized as emotion antecedents.

Evidence for similarity in antecedent events also comes from large-scale questionnaire studies among European, American, and Japanese college students (Scherer, Summerfield & Wallbott, 1983; Scherer et al., 1988; Scherer, Wallbott & Summerfield, 1986). In these studies, subjects were asked to describe a situation or event that had caused them to feel an emotion of sadness, anger, fear, or happiness. The subjects came from five Western European countries in Scherer et al. (1983), seven Western European countries and Israel in Scherer et al. (1986), and Europe, the United States, and Japan in Scherer et al. (1988). The situations mentioned by the subjects were grouped into general categories. No culture-specific categories were needed to describe the event antecedents. In all cultures, the most important event categories were: good and bad news, continuation of or problems with relationships (e.g., pleasure from contact with friends, feeling rejected, fear of quarrels), temporary meetings (e.g., meeting one's friend for dinner), separation (e.g., journey), permanent separation, birth and death, pleasure (e.g., sex, music), interaction with strangers, and success and failure in achievement situations. The categories that were needed to describe the antecedent events for each particular emotion were, to a large extent, also similar across cultures. Thus, there is evidence that particular emotions are cross-culturally elicited by similar antecedents.

These findings carry the implication that a large number of event types bear emotional meaning to many or most human beings, regardless of their cultural origin. The studies suggest a high degree of commonality in human emotional sensitivities or in basic human concerns.

Differences in Antecedent Events

There is also some evidence for cultural differences in emotion-eliciting events because (1) the same situations are interpreted differently across cultures, and therefore, lead to different emotions, (2) the living conditions in different cultures vary, resulting in the occurrence of culture-specific events, or (3) events derive their significance from certain culture-specific beliefs.

Various cultures interpret the condition of "being alone" differently. Among the Utku Inuit, the circumstance of being alone, or being left alone, always repre-

sents serious social isolation and leads to sadness or, more precisely, loneliness (Briggs, 1970). Tahitians take a different perspective: Being alone is perceived as an opportunity for spirits to bother a person, causing uncanny feelings and sometimes also fear (Levy, 1973). The Pintupi Aboriginals of Australia consider it unusual that one could be happy sitting alone, because it means not being among kin and not showing or being shown affection. Sitting alone is an indication that the relationships between the individual and those considered as kin are not running smoothly, which prevents one from experiencing happiness (Myers, 1979). In some Western cultures, being alone may be welcomed as an occasion of privacy, leading to feelings of contentment or happiness, or alternatively not leading to any particular feelings at all.

Cultural differences in antecedent events can also be related to different social or physical conditions. Racism is an example of a social condition from which some groups of people will suffer more than others. In a study among Dutch, Surinamese, and Turkish people in the Netherlands, we found that 10 percent of the Surinamese and Turkish but none of the Dutch respondents reported discrimination as an anger antecedent (Mesquita, in preparation). In this case, differences in the nature of anger antecedents are clearly due to a different exposure of the dominant group as opposed to the minorities of the country. Differences in the types of events eliciting specific emotions have also been found as a result of specific physical living conditions. The Utku emotions *kappia* and *iqhi*, for example, are reported as "both alike [to] apply to fear of dangerous animals, evil spirits, natural hazards such as thin ice or a rough sea, angry people, and an angry God" (Briggs, 1970, p. 344). Physical conditions account for part of the variation in the antecedent events of emotions in the category of fear.

Some of the antecedents of *kappia* and *iqhi* are created by the specific spiritual beliefs, which constitute a distinct source of differences in emotion-eliciting events, in addition to differences due to different interpretations and differences due to different physical and social circumstances. Other examples abound where such spiritual beliefs constitute the antecedents of emotion: the concern with black magic in Surinam (Wooding, 1981), the constant fear of God among 17th century white Americans, and the firm belief of Jehovah's Witnesses to be saved from the world's decline.

Whether one finds similarities or differences depends, to some degree, on the level of description. On the one hand, it is conceivable that similarities yielded by questionnaire studies would be less pervasive if the event categories were chosen at a more concrete level. Many culture-specific emotion antecedents, on the other hand, would be non-specific at a slightly more general level of description (see above). To the extent that universal meanings (e.g., risky conditions) explain as much of the variation in emotional responses as do the concrete antecedent events (e.g., thin ice and evil spirits), we consider the cultural differences in antecedents to be trivial.

Not all differences in antedent events are trivial, though. Some antecedent events represent culture-specific meanings. This means that the emotional responses to antecedent events cannot be understood unless the culture-specific

meaning of the events is taken into account. It is impossible, for instance, to understand the emotional responses to "black magic," when black magic is reduced to the universal antecedent category of "harm by another person." We suggest that a level of description be selected that accounts for the variation in emotional responses to a particular antecedent event; that is, the level of description should leave out details that are irrelevant to the consequent emotional reactions, but should include those aspects of meaning that account for subsequent emotional reactions. The research practice, thus far, has been that antecedent events are described without justifying the degree of concreteness chosen.

The distinction of potential versus practice may be thought to apply to antecedent events as well. Even those events that potentially elicit emotions across cultures do so more readily in some cultures than in others. In one of our own studies, we found that "harm inflicted by another person" elicited anger and/or sadness in Dutch and Surinamese respondents, but that these emotions were elicited to different degrees; the Dutch reported more sadness, whereas the Surinamese reported more anger (Mesquita, in preparation). Another example comes from Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993), who found that social transgressions and unconventional food and sex practices were more readily appraised as immoral by Brazilians than by Americans, and less appraised in terms of morality by highly educated than by less educated subjects in both cultures. The authors assume that the appraisal of something as immoral is likely to elicit a response of disgust. Therefore, social transgressions, unconventional food and sex more readily elicited a reaction of disgust in the Brazilian and less educated samples than in the American and higher educated samples.

In sum, cultural differences and similarities in the nature of antecedent events have been found. Some of the differences appear to be irrelevant to the nature of emotions; this is the case when the emotional response to concrete events can be understood by reducing those events to their universally shared meanings. It is not always possible to understand the emotional responses to an event without maintaining some of its culture-specificity. In the latter case, the nature of antecedent events differs across cultures in a non-trivial way. Most of the cultural differences that occur are differences with respect to the frequency with which certain events elicit particular emotional responses.

Subjective Experience

Subjective emotional experience is, in some theories, that which cannot be further reduced or analyzed in terms of components, and which can only be designated by the corresponding emotion words. Usually, in these theories, one assumes the existence of a small set of qualia, identified with "basic emotions" (see section on basic emotions).

This hypothesis is obviously unprofitable for cross-cultural research, because it prejudices the issue of cross-cultural generality, and runs into the problem just discussed, where the lexical equivalents of basic emotion terms (to the extent that they exist in a particular language) are not linguistically identical.

Emotional experiences, including those falling into one of the "basic" classes, can be profitably analyzed in terms of components. Emotional experiences may consist of the awareness of one's: a) appraisals, b) state of action readiness, c) physiological upset, or d) further cognitive components, notably, cognitive connotations and implications, and (e) evaluation of one's emotions.

There is one qualitative dimension that can be considered as an unanalyzable element of experience, and that is hedonic experience, or the experiences of pleasure and pain. Their basic status is attested by introspective analysis (Wundt, 1902), dimensional analyses of emotion words, similarities of facial expressions, and emotional experiences. Factor analyses of such data have yielded hedonic tone (together with emotional activation) as the major factor, a finding confirmed by the results of cross-cultural research (Russell, 1983).

Different emotional experiences, then, correspond to varied patterns of values on the components, including a core feeling component that can be described as the hedonic tone. For the cross-cultural study of subjective emotional experience, one would need a comparative study of the building blocks of these experiences (that is, of the separate components and the values these can take).

In principle, it is possible to find experiences that lack certain components, even core hedonic feeling, and that still qualify as emotional experiences because of their antecedents. There may be culturally determined phenomena of this kind. For instance, Tahitians are said to become just tired in response to threatening events or losses (Levy, 1973; 1984); whether that fatigue should be called a variant of sadness presents the same kind of problem (and no other kind of problem) as that confronting a Western psychiatrist who has to understand a patient's loss of interest in life following personal loss.

The labeling of emotional experience largely follows the patterns of the components as described in the remainder of this section. However, emotional experience is not described adequately as a pattern of such components at a specific moment. In line with the process view of emotions, emotional experiences include awareness of the temporal development of the emotions, and of their likely implications with regard to their social context. Emotional experiences include reflections of the fit between one's emotion and social norms or expectations, of expected social reactions to one's emotion, and of the implications of one's emotion for further social interactions. Presumably, it makes a considerable difference for the emotional experience whether one feels one's emotion to be in line with or counter to social norms, or whether one feels it has social consequences or is a private affair. Experiences of "shame," for example, or of the emotional response to events involving honor, can be expected to differ considerably in England and in Mediterranean countries for that reason (cf. Abu-Lughod, 1986; Blok, 1980; Scheff, 1988). Another aspect presumably influencing the quality of emotional experiences is the obviousness of emotion-related appraisals. We have shown that the meaning of both concern-relevant situations and consequent emotional responses become better defined, and consequently, the experience of the emotion becomes more obvious, as the concern becomes more culturally focal (see section on the meaning of culture).

It follows then that subjective experiences of the same emotion can be considerably different in different cultures, depending on which components of the emotion dominate in the experience. Two emotions of anger may be experienced in totally different manners, according to whether the response is felt as socially approved, obvious, enhancing social standing and leading to overt rejection of the offensive agent, or whether it is hardly felt at all because of the awareness that it will isolate one from other people and damage self esteem. There is no contradiction in arguing that what dynamically is the "same" emotion can be experienced in quite different fashions in different cultures. This explains why the subjective similarities between particular emotions, as assessed by free grouping methods (e.g., Lutz, 1982), may drastically differ form one culture to another, while the emotions (the component patterns) may still be regarded as the same, or at least as closely related.

Appraisal

Appraisal processes are presumably nonconscious and automatic. They can be conceived of as a series of automatic evaluations with respect to a set of appraisal dimensions (Scherer, 1984). The major dimensions discussed in the literature are attention to changing conditions (novelty/familiarity); a sense of pleasure or distaste (unpleasantness/pleasantness); a sense of uncertainty (or certainty); perception of an obstacle; a sense of being in control or being out of control (controllability); attribution of agency (human or nonhuman agent, agency by oneself or someone else); a sense of changed self-esteem (enhanced or decreased); a sense of the likely praise, censure, or ridicule of one's group (enhanced or decreased status); and an ultimate judgment of the value or fitness of what has happened (norm (in)compatibility) (Ellsworth, 1994; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988, Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Different patterns of appraisal are assumed to correspond to different emotions, and empirical evidence supports this assumption (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & Terschure, 1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985)

In spite of widely divergent disciplinary and historical traditions, there is a high degree of convergence with respect to the nature of the appraisal dimensions postulated by different theories (see Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Manstead & Tetlock, 1989; Reisenzein & Hofmann, 1990; 1993; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1988). In addition to this convergence, several recent empirical studies have provided support for the notion that a limited number of appraisal or evaluation dimensions are sufficient to explain the elicitation and differentiation of emotional states.

The notion of appraisal is closely linked to motivational concepts like that of concern, goal or need. The notion of concern will be used here to refer to goals, motives, values, and expectations about oneself or others, and about the world in which one lives. Examples of concerns are: concern for physical well-being and safety, self-esteem, the status of one's group, and for closeness of loved ones. What is labeled "concerns" also includes values and norms that are shared in a culture,

inasmuch as they are held by the individual: religious observance, honor of one's country, people, or tribe; intellectual freedom; and so forth. An event may be relevant to more than one concern simultaneously. For instance, a failure may be harmfully relevant for one's material pursuit, self-worth, and for the prestige of one's family. The appraisal outcomes will be accordingly complex.

Both the appraisal dimensions and the concerns against which the event's impact are checked may vary cross-culturally. As in antecedent events, however, differences emerge more often in degrees, and are only rarely a matter of absence in one culture and presence in another.

Appraisal Dimensions

Research seems to show that people in different cultures evaluate events along similar appraisal dimensions, but that the frequency with which certain appraisal dimensions are used in the emotional assesssment of events is subject to variation. Analogous to our discussion of the antecedent events, we will consider to what extent and in what respects emotional appraisal varies across cultures, rather than concentrate on whether or not emotional appraisal differs cross-culturally.

Several recent studies have provided evidence that the appraisal dimensions used by people are similar across cultures (Frijda et al., 1995; Matsumoto, Kudoh, Scherer & Wallbott, 1988; Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992; Wallbott & Scherer, 1988). Some of these studies have compared emotion words from disparate languages with respect to the outcomes on various appraisal dimensions. In most studies, subjects were presented with a particular emotion word and asked to report a situation or event that had caused them to experience that emotion. Emotion words used in different languages were each others' translations. Subsequently, subjects were asked to rate the emotion-eliciting event just reported with respect to various appraisal dimensions. Various studies have yielded two findings that suggest cross-cultural similarity. The first is that lexically equivalent emotion words have largely similar appraisal patterns (Frijda et al, 1995; Roseman, Dhawan, Rettek, Naidu & Thapa, 1995). For example, Frijda et al. (1995) found a similar core of appraisal for anger words in Japanese, Indonesian, and Dutch, "consisting of the experience of something unpleasant and that has obstructed one's reaching one's goals, which event was felt to be unfair but inevitable, and for which someone else is to blame" (p. 139). Other studies have found similar appraisal patterns for anger words in English (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Roseman, 1991). The agreement in appraisal patterns for various emotions is not surprising, because emotion words are translated on the basis of, in part at least, such agreement. The second finding is less self-evident: A common set of appraisal dimensions accounts, to a considerable extent, for the differentiation between emotion words in all languages of study. There is some evidence for cross-cultural similarity in the relative significance of various appraisal dimensions accounting for most of the variation (Frijda et al., 1995; Mauro et al., 1992; Scherer, in press). Thus, the same appraisal dimensions provide a satisfactory descriptive framework for emotions in different languages.

Some evidence for cross-cultural convergence in the appraisal of particular types of situations has also been found. Mesquita (in preparation) asked Dutch, Surinamese, and Turkish people living in the Netherlands to rate a list of appraisal questions for six situation types. Examples of some of the situation types were "receiving compliments or admiration," "success," "offense by a non-intimate other," and "offense by an intimate other." The appraisals in the three cultures were, to a large extent, similar. For example, all three groups appraised the situation of offense by a non-intimate other as "unpleasant, unexpected, another person's responsibility, avoidable, and harmful for self-esteem." More research is required to decide whether similarity in the appraisals of such types of situations can be more generally found across cultures.

Cross-cultural research on appraisal has been less than systematic, which renders it difficult to draw firm conclusions on the cross-cultural similarity. It is unclear to what extent the appraisal dimensions thus far included in research are exhaustive for the different ways in which emotional events are evaluated. Appraisal dimensions have mainly been generated on the basis of intuition. It may be that there are additional, and possibly culture-specific, dimensions of appraisal that have as yet been overlooked (see Ellsworth, 1994, for a similar argument). For instance, none of the appraisal theories has proposed a dimension of divine agency, magical sources, or fate. There is no reason why these would not be added to the repertoire of agency dimensions that do occur in Western, secular emotion theories (such as other responsible, self responsible, nobody responsible).

Cultural differences in appraisals can be understood as differences in the practice, or propensity, to use certain appraisal dimensions. Matsumoto et al. (1988) found cultural differences with respect to the number of subjects who were unwilling to attribute the responsibility for joy, fear, anger, disgust, shame, and guilt antecedents to either themselves or other people. For all emotions, significantly more Japanese than American subjects responded "not applicable," when asked about responsibility for the emotional event (percentages were not provided). Consistently, Scherer et al. (1988) found that, compared to the American and European groups, Japanese subjects reported relatively fewer instances of injustice as anger antecedents (21 percent of the American and European anger antecedents, but only 4 percent of the Japanese). These findings correspond with those of Mauro et al. (1992) who reported, among others, that the use of the appraisal dimension of responsibility differed cross-culturally, such that students from the United States made more use of the responsibility dimension than students from Japan.

Ethnographies, pointing to the conspicuous presence or absence of a particular type of emotion in a given cultural group, also suggest culture-specific appraisal propensities. For instance, Solomon (1978) linked the low incidence of anger among the Utku to a reluctance to blame another person for a negative event. He argued that ". . . . anger violates the Utku 'rational' worldview, and includes judgements and structures which are unjustifiable. . . . Anger adds blame to frustration and annoyance. It includes a quasi-moral 'ought'-type claim. . . . The Utku, much more than any of us, are used to extreme hardship and discomfort. Their

philosophy therefore, is that such things must be tolerated, not flailed against. . . . Aggression only makes things more unpleasant and does no good, so the rational attitude under the circumstances is simple resignation and acceptance" (p. 193/194). Such an interpretation of difference in anger occurrence is, of course, distinct from interpretations assuming that anger was actually evoked by acts from actors appraised as blameworthy, but the expression of which was subsequently suppressed.[6]

In sum, various appraisal dimensions appear to be cross-culturally useful in the description of emotional events and cross-culturally relevant to the distinction between different emotion categories. There is no evidence for the existence of culture-specific appraisal dimensions, although this does not rule out that such dimensions may exist. The currently available evidence suggests that the appraisal potential is largely similar across cultures. As holds true for the antecedents, cultural differences tend to emerge with respect to the prevalence of specific appraisal categories. Propensities to use certain appraisal dimensions rather than others appear to differ cross-culturally.

Concerns and Values

Although there is little research that systematically compares concerns in different cultures, it seems evident that universalities in the human condition bring along some similarity in concerns. The loss of attachment figures, the esteem received from other people, one's own well-being and that of intimate other people, all must be among such universal concerns. Even concerns that appear to be cross-culturally different at one level of description, often lose their culture-specificity when described at a slightly more general level. For example, the concern for honor may be specific to Mediterranean cultures, among others, but the cultural differences are likely to dissolve if the same concern is described as a concern for personal integrity or social status. It is questionable, however, that the generalization of honor to a concern of a higher level of abstraction (such as social or moral status) does justice to those aspects of the concern that account for the emotional reactions provoked by concern-relevant events. Further, it is certainly questionable that one can have a full-blown understanding of honor-related emotions, such as shame and pride, without reference to honor. Honor has to do with a person's moral caliber and that of the other people. In addition, honor depends on external validation: one's moral caliber is not reflected as honor unless other people are (made) aware of it. With that said, one has to realize that honor has many emotion-relevant meanings, not included in concepts like morality and social status. There appear to be clear sex differences (cf. Abu-Lughod, 1986; Blok, 1981, Pitt-Rivers, 1965). Men's honor consists of being in control of their own family and of outperforming or impressing other men. Women's honor consists of confirming their husbands' and fathers' guidance by modesty and faithfulness. Likewise, shameful events have been reported to elicit different reactions: men try to restore their honor by showing off, by aggression, or by retaliation; women will react to (potentially) shameful events by extraordinary submissive behavior and avoidance (see e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1986). It is interesting to note that the emotional phe-

nomena are better understood when a culture-specific description of the concern (such as honor) is adopted than when the concern is aggregated to a universal concern. There is thus evidence for culture-specific concerns. Analogous to the antecedent events, it is difficult to arrive at a level of description of concerns that leaves out irrelevant details, but maintains information relevant to the understanding of subsequent emotional reactions.

Cultural differences are also found in the focality of concerns (see section on the meaning of culture). Value priorities are likely to determine which concerns are focal. It seems quite plausible that events that have an impact on the family or social group have greater importance in collectivistic as compared to individualistic cultures, as found in some recent research (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 1994b; Mesquita, in preparation). Conversely, self-esteem and achievement might be more central concerns in individualistic cultures. Cultural focality of concerns makes for a qualitative difference in appraisal, in addition to a difference in accessibility (see earlier discussion).

In sum, it is plausible that there are some universal human concerns, despite some differences in the concerns that are available or most accessible. The precise nature of concerns as well as the focality of concerns may differ across cultures. Cultural focality of a concern seems to further appraisal of events in terms of that concern.

Physiological Reactions

Another question addressed in cross-cultural research on emotions is related to the cross-cultural variations in the physiological responses accompanying particular emotions. The hypothesis underlying much of this research is that different emotions are universally accompanied by specific and unique patterns of physiological responses.

Measurement of Physiological Responses

To study cross-cultural variations in the physiological responses accompanying certain emotions, one has to actually measure physiological responses. This approach has been far from popular; in fact, few studies along this line exist. One study measured physiological responses in young Minangkabau men living in West Sumatra under conditions thought to be relevant to certain "basic emotions," and compared the results with those obtained in previous studies with American students (Levenson, Ekman, Heider, & Friesen, 1992). The study made use of the Directed Facial Action task, in which subjects are asked to voluntarily move their face muscles according to the directions given to them (e.g., raise, lower, or tighten certain parts of the face, such as eyebrow, cheek, lip). The directions led to various facial expressions prototypical for some basic emotions; for instance, subjects were asked to pull their lips down and make several other movements for a disgust face. The physiological measures taken were heart rate, finger temperature, skin conductance, finger pulse transmission time, finger pulse amplitude, respiratory period, and respiratory depth. The results were complicated, but led the authors

to claim that the data lend support to cross-culturally consistent physiological differentiation between the basic emotions. There is reason to challenge this claim, though. Penetrating critique has been aimed at the kind of study reported (see Cacioppo, Klein, Berntson & Hatfield, 1993; Zajonc & Macintosh, 1992). The most important reason for this critique is the lack of consistency of results across studies. The overwhelming evidence from experimental research done in Western cultures, so far, indicates the absence of unique patterns of physiological responses differentiating between different emotions (Stemmler, 1989). The failure to find unique patterns of physiology may be due to the relatively low intensities of emotions evoked in the laboratory.

The focus of a study like the preceding one is on the potential for certain patterns of physiological responses. Provided that this potential is cross-culturally similar, independent cultural differences may still occur with respect to the practice or propensity to certain (patterns of) physiological responses, due to different degrees in which certain responses are tolerated or valued. For example, crying among the Bedouins in the Egyptian desert (Abu-Lughod, 1986) is considered a sign of weakness, whereas in other cultures, like the Turkish, under many circumstances, it is considered a perfectly acceptable social response. Differences in the prevalence of certain physiological responses may also follow from different appraisal or action readiness propensities. For instance, Harburg et al. (1973) reported that socioculturally deprived African-Americans in Detroit responded to frustrations with sharper increases in blood pressure than European Americans. In all likelihood, there were parallel sociocultural differences in the emotional meaning of the frustrations, such as perceived control. A similar relationship between action readiness propensities and culture-specific physiological patterns is conceivable; for example, the inclination to aggressive responses may be related to the tensing of muscles, and increased heartbeat. Research addressing the issue does not exist.

Self-Reports of Physiological Responses

A second type of approach to the question of cross-cultural similarity in physiological patterns has been to ask the subjects to report the physiological symptoms that had accompanied a particular emotional experience. Thus, respondents reported an instance of a particular emotion, for example, anger, and were then asked to describe the physiological reactions that had accompanied the emotion. A recent and comprehensive study in this vein compared the physiological responses in thirty-seven countries reported to accompany seven emotions: joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, shame, and guilt (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). Distinct patterns of physiological responses were similarly reported across cultures. For example, joy was on the average characterized by feeling warm and a faster heart beat, and sadness by tense muscles, lump in the throat, and crying/sobbing. A considerably larger part of the variation in reported physiological responses was explained by the type of emotion than was accounted for by either country or the interaction of country and type of emotions. Still, there was some variation due to country (and since country is not necessarily the best operationalization of cul-

ture, the effect of culture may even be larger than suggested by the authors). The patterns of variation were not reported.

This consistency contrasts with the usually weak or negative findings with actual measurement of evoked physiological response patterns in various emotions (Stemmler, 1989). The explanation is an open question. A possible interpretation is that cross-culturally stable physiological reactions in intense emotion instances have given rise to stereotyped expectations concerning the changes that occur with these emotions (Rimé, Philippot & Cisamolo, 1990). The stereotyped expectations may not necessarily correspond to the changes that actually occur.

Some cultural differences in the propensities to report certain physiological changes have been found. A comparison between the physiological changes reported by subjects from Southern and Northern European regions yielded, for instance, that "the reputedly 'hot-blooded' southerners reported significantly more blood pressure changes (in joy, sadness, and anger), whereas the cold northerners reported significantly more stomach sensations (for joy and fear) and muscle symptoms (for anger)" (Rimé & Giovannini, 1986, p. 90/91). Other examples of such differences are available in the literature (e.g., Scherer et al., 1988), explanations for which are rare, and largely speculative.

Action Readiness

Emotions involve changes in action readiness: an increase or decrease in the general state of activation, or the emergence of particular action tendencies. Forms of activation include hyper- and hypo-activation (or exuberance and apathy, respectively), tenseness, and inhibition. Various forms of action readiness are best described in terms of their relational meaning; that is, as relational aims. In fact, forms of action readiness in emotion are forms of readiness for major interaction patterns. Major examples of action tendencies are approach, withdrawal and avoidance, rejection, help-seeking, hostility, breaking contact, dominance, and submission (Davitz, 1969; Frijda, 1986). Different emotions tend to involve different kinds of action readiness, or tend to be defined by them. For instance, the impulse to protect oneself from a danger is a state usually called "fear" in English. Changes in action readiness do not always lead to changes in actual behavior. They may only be felt impulses or lack of impulse, and thus be part of emotional experience. The behaviors, that manifest a given form of action readiness, usually are highly variable; impulse to stop being bothered by an offender may result in one of the many physical and non-physical forms of hostile behavior, or merely in breaking off contact.

Attention to changes in action readiness are of recent origin in cross-cultural research. There are a few studies cross-culturally comparing the action readiness patterns reported for different emotions (see discussion that follows). Subjects in these studies were asked to recall an instance of an emotional experience, indicated by an emotion word, and then to answer questions about changes in action readiness.

Similarities in Action Readiness

In the extensive cross-national study cited earlier (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994), subjects were asked about seven major emotions. Included in the questionnaire were questions asking whether their emotional experience had led them to move toward, move away from, or move against (aggress) the object of emotion. Considerable cross-cultural similarity was found in the action readiness patterns for the emotions studied. As would have been expected, joy caused more approach behaviors than the other emotions studied, anger elicited more aggression, and withdrawal was most common in sadness, disgust, shame, and guilt. Emotion accounted for most of the variation in action readiness responses. Some variation was accounted for by country, and by the interaction between country and emotion, however.

When described at a high level of abstraction, considerable cross-cultural generality in action readiness modes appears. Frijda and his colleagues studied action readiness changes associated with nineteen lexically equivalent words in Japanese, Indonesian, and Dutch (Frijda et al., 1995). The questions in their action readiness questionnaire were more numerous, and at a more concrete level of description, than those of Scherer and Wallbott (1994). The former included such questions as: "Did you feel like avoiding or fleeing? Did you feel the tendency to break contact with another person or did you feel finished with that other person? Did you have the tendency to keep or push something away?" Again, considerable similarity was found for the major lexical equivalents. Furthermore, separate factor analyses for the three cultural groups indicated five rather similar factors: moving away, moving towards, moving against, helplessness, and submission. Note that the first three factors correspond to the action readiness questions used in the Scherer and Wallbott (1994) study. These factors may be seen as representing the core of the relational meaning of the action readiness modes.

Incidentally, a major aspect of emotional action readiness is its character of impulse, involving a shift of behavioral control and a tendency to override other concerns of the moment. This feature can be considered as more or less defining the scientific category of emotion. So far, there is no evidence that this control precedence (Frijda, 1986) is not universal. This implies that, even when the concept of "emotion" may not be present in all languages (cf. Russell, 1991; Van Brakel, 1994), the phenomenon of emotion is still likely to be present in the cultures concerned.

Differences in Action Readiness

Differences in action readiness have been found as well. First, in the study just described (Frijda et al., 1995), the contribution to explained variance by the factors differed drastically from one culture to the other. "Moving away," for instance, was twice as important for the Dutch than for the other two groups, while the reverse held for "moving towards." Individual items also differed sharply, in the factors they loaded on, in the average values across the emotions included in the study, and in their value for discriminating one emotion term from another. For instance, "wish to depend on someone else" and "apathy" scored much higher

for the Japanese than for the other two groups. The Japanese also more often reported feelings of helplessness and urges to protect themselves as aspects of the various emotional experiences. These results converge with studies using quite different methodologies, which suggest that depending on intimate others as well as acceptance by others (harmonizing with the environment) are important and valued components of emotional life in Japan (Lebra, 1976, 1983; Markus & Kitayama, 1994b).

Important differences were also found for individual emotion categories. For instance, impulse toward hostile behavior was more important for anger (or in the moving against factor) for the Dutch group, and "boiling inwardly" for the other two.

Changes in action readiness in response to different types of situations were examined in a study comparing Dutch, Surinamese, and Turkish people living in the Netherlands (see section on appraisal). Significant group differences emerged. For example, the latter two groups reported that, in situations in which they had themselves behaved immorally towards an intimate other, they did not dare to look the other person in the face, and that they had the desire not to be noticed or seen; while in similar situations, the Dutch reported no such tendencies. The disparities were again best described as differences in degree. In situations in which the subject had been offended by an intimate other, subjects in all three groups reported "boiling inwardly," and feeling an inclination to physical as well as verbal aggression, but the Dutch group reported these action readiness modes to a lesser degree than the other two groups.

Emotional Expression

Cross-cultural study of emotional behavior has mainly focused on facial expression. This research is interesting and important; yet, in our view, its importance has been overrated. There is no good reason why facial expression should be treated the way it often is, as the major criterion of the occurrence of a particular emotion in a given culture, or as an indication for the universality of a given emotion (see e.g., Ekman, 1994a; Levenson et al., 1992). The presumption in adopting facial expressions as the decisive criterion of emotions is that the facial expressions are discrete and typical for basic emotions. However, this argument has little empirical basis. We consider facial expression as just one component, though an important one, because it is an elementary channel through which action readiness becomes manifest. The issues of major interest for cross-cultural psychology are those of the evidence for universality and innateness of facial expressions, and for cultural specificities and learning.

Cultural Similarities in Expression

Research on the possible universality of facial expressions has mainly made use of one paradigm: presenting the subjects with still photographs showing face and shoulders, each face with a different (usually posed) expression. In most studies, the photographs shown were selected out of much larger collections, on the grounds

of likely or proven unambiguity (Izard, 1994; Russell, 1994). Subjects were asked to identify the facial expressions. Various methods have been used: (a) checking one out of a small set (6–10) of emotion words (the "standard method"), (b) rating each expression on a small set of emotion scales, (c) having subjects produce their own label for each expression, and (d) matching the expressions with a small set of brief stories describing an emotional event (the "Dashiell method").

There is overwhelming evidence for universality of a set of facial expresssions of emotion. The evidence is mostly indirect, as it comes from cross-cultural correspondence in the recognition or labeling of facial expressions. The number of universal facial expression patterns is at least six; that is the number of emotions that has been discriminated. The number of universally discriminable expressions should be larger since it is likely to include laughter, crying, pouting, and the nonfacial expression of foot-stamping (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1974). The universal patterns of expression are presumably innate, either as patterns or with regard to the components, such as frowning and eye-widening, that may be seen as their building blocks (Scherer, 1992; Smith, 1989).

Although subjects from nearly all cultures investigated reliably distinguished posed expressions, supposedly corresponding to anger, sadness, disgust, fear, happiness, and surprise, from one another, the degree to which they did so is appreciably higher in subjects from literate than illiterate cultures (Russell, 1994). With the standard method (see above), the average percentage agreement in labeling was about 70 percent for subjects from literate groups, and approximately 40 percent for subjects from illiterate groups. In both cases, however, the percent "correct" recognitions (that is, correspondence with the emotion label meant by the experimenters) was far above chance (Ekman, 1994a; Russell, 1994). Compared to the standard method, free labeling techniques yield appreciably lower percentages "correct" identifications, but usually still way above chance level.

The universal facial expressions provide strong support for the hypothesis that certain central emotion mechanisms (modes of action readiness, or of interpersonal messages relevant to certain interpersonal contingencies) are indeed universal. The expressions that were universally recognized must have some common core of emotional meaning. These core meanings are roughly reflected by the English words happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, surprise, and, perhaps, contempt. Evidence for universality of facial expressions of emotion would indicate the existence of a universal potential for emotion communication. Research endeavors have largely been based on the assumption that basic emotions are marked by distinct and unique facial expressions, and the research outcomes have been treated in the context of the putative universality of six to ten basic emotions (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1982; Izard, 1971). As discussed in the introduction, that linkage is not necessarily correct.

The conclusion that universality in the recognition of facial expressions demonstrates the existence of universal basic emotions is, therefore, not warranted. Rather than understanding facial expressions in terms of basic emotions, we view them as first manifestations of different types of action readiness, that is, types of

interpersonal messages relevant to person–environment interactions (for an elaborate discussion see Frijda & Tcherkassof, in press; Russell, 1994).

Cultural Differences in Expression

Universality of the patterns notwithstanding, there are significant group differences in the percentages of agreement in assigning specific labels to particular expressions. The percentage of agreement is rarely perfect in any cultural group. Recognition rates range from 98 percent (for "happiness" in an American sample) to 49 percent (for the equivalent of "fear" in an "African" group) for literate subjects, and from 99 percent (for "happiness" in a pidgin Fore sample) to 19 percent (for "surprise" in an isolated Fore sample) (figures taken from Russell, 1994).

Apart from cultural differences in task familiarity, at least two explanations for the established cross-cultural differences in expression are conceivable. First, the meaning of certain expressions might be distinctly different in different cultures, due to differential learning. So far, there has been no evidence in support of this explanation. Second, cultural differences in recognition rates may be due to differences in word meanings, or in the precise emotional connotations of stories used in the Dashiell method. Even when a given word (say, *marah* in Indonesian) is considered the best translation of a given English word (in this case, "anger"), its connotations may be (and in fact are) distinctly different. It is possible that the degrees to which lexical equivalents in different languages correspond to certain types of facial expressions differ.

Evidence for culture-specific facial expressions exists, but is limited. One of these is tongue protrusion as a sign of shame in the Indian Orissa culture (Menon & Shweder, 1994). This type of facial expression is presumably culturally learned.

The previous discussion pertains to potential for facial expressions of emotion. It has little or nothing to do with the practice of facial expressions in daily interaction, nor with their frequency, their prominence or typicality, or even their precise nature. Little is known about cross-cultural differences in the ecology of facial expressions.

The universality finding does not imply that given emotions as categorized by the language, invariably produce the same facial expression. Fear, for instance, may be manifest in frowning as described by Ekman and Friesen (1978), but it may also be expressed by widely opened eyes and lifted eyebrows (in which case it is close to the one defined as surprise by Ekman and Friesen, hence the confusion in some illiterate cultures). Likewise, different expressions of anger can be distinguished (Klineberg, 1938). Cultural differences in the recognition or production of facial expressions may result from culturally different tendencies to use one type of expression rather than another.

Ekman and Friesen (1969) have coined the important notion of *display rules* to explain such differences in the ecology of facial expressions. Cultures may differentially suppress, attenuate, and/or enhance facial expressivity or particular expressions in particular social contexts. Although direct observational evidence for the operation of such rules is sparse (but see Ekman, 1982), prescriptions are widely found in informal, anthropological (Briggs, 1970; Lutz, 1987), and etiquette litera-

ture (e.g., Elias, 1969). In addition, empirical studies exist on how such rules are learned (e.g., Saarni, 1979, 1984).

"Display rules" may not be the most appropriate general term to refer to the source of cultural variations in expressive behavior, because the issue of importance may not be the expression per se, but rules of conduct and respect in certain interactions. For the Japanese, facial expressions of displeasure seem to be replaced by the expression corresponding to polite intercourse (the smile), rather than suppressed in face-to-face contact (Lebra, 1976). Display rules may also affect emotions more profoundly, influencing them beyond expression per se. Smiling in Japanese people, for example, may help them to focus on the interaction, and thus, draw their attention away from the source of discontent. In that sense, the term display rules is not very well chosen (see Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992, for a similar critique).

Finally, particular facial expressions may have appreciably different meanings in different cultures, notwithstanding the fact that their basic emotional message is similar. A smile may be an expression of pleasure or friendliness everywhere, but showing friendliness may be insolence in one culture, a reason for distrust in another, and a requirement in social interaction in a third. In other words, cross-cultural correspondence with regard to facial expression at one level in no way rules out the possibility of wide differences in the role and meaning of such process at another level.

Cognitive Consequences

There is ample evidence that emotional states may have consequences for cognitive processing.[7] People who experience positive affect differ from those who experience negative affect regarding memory access, strategies of problem solving and categorization, and regarding the evaluative judgments they make of other people and of their lives in general (Bower, 1981; Clore, Schwarz & Conway, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Different negative emotions may shape cognitive processing in different ways. For instance, anger has been found to lead to more personal attribution of negative events and circumstances, as compared to both sadness and neutral conditions; whereas sadness leads to a tendency to understand negative circumstances as more due to impersonal forces (Keltner, Ellsworth & Edwards, 1993). Also, emotional states may lead to belief changes,[8]which may either last briefly or permanently. They result from generalizing the emotional appraisal of the eliciting event to a class of events or actors (Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans & Van Goozen, 1991). For example, a failed love affair may lead to loss of faith in relationships in general, and an unpleasant incident involving a member of a particular group may lead to, or support, group prejudice. It is not hard to imagine that there would be cultural differences in the cognitive processes accompanying emotions, even though research in this area is scarce.

Cultural differences in emotions may result in differences in emotion-related cognitive processes; for example, differences in the frequency of positive emotions may lead to a different use of heuristics, or to a difference in the tendency to

give positive evaluations, and so forth. Recent studies have pointed to cultural differences in the degree to which people strive for and experience positive emotions. Kitayama, Markus, and Kurokawa (referred to by Markus & Kitayama, 1994b) asked American and Japanese students living in the United States to report on the frequency with which they experienced certain emotions in daily life. "The Americans reported an overwhelmingly greater frequency of experiencing positive than negative self-relevant feelings, but there was virtually no such effect among the Japanese" (p. 108). It is an empirical question whether the different ratios of positive self-feelings, in Americans, result in corresponding differences in the use of cognitive strategies found to accompany positive affect. Also, Akiyama (1992), working with a large sample of elderly Japanese people, did not find the inverse correlation between positive and negative affect characteristic of the comparable American samples. In the Japanese sample, there was virtually no correlation between positive and negative emotions. Moreover, the Japanese levels of both positive and negative affect were considerably lower than those of Americans. The impression these studies give is that there are differences in the frequency of positive affect, and possibly also in the intensity of both positive and negative affect. The cognitive strategies that are dominant in cultures as different as the American and the Japanese can be predicted to diverge on the basis of differences in the emotional practice in these cultures. Provided that the nature of the respective cognitive consequences of positive and negative affect do not differ cross-culturally, the dominant cognitive strategies will differ between Americans and Japanese people. Compared to the latter, the former will be found to more readily adopt strategies associated with positive affect or with intense feelings.

Also, cultural differences in emotions may be reinforced or amplified by the cognitive changes to which they give rise. As reported, anger in Americans gave rise to a stronger tendency to attribute negative events to human agency, whereas sadness tended to lead to attribution of the same events to impersonal factors. It may be argued that the appraisal of blame (something negative attributed to human agency) is a central condition to the emergence of anger. Hence, anger may be expected to have cognitive consequences that, in turn, facilitate the emergence of more anger. Significant cultural differences in the tendency to react with anger may be due to this self-reinforcing mechanism. Evidence of the cognitive consequences of other emotions than the ones mentioned does not exist; speculation about cultural differences in these cognitive consequences thus seems pointless.

There also may exist differences in some general parameters of the cognitive consequences of emotions across cultures. Some evidence suggests that the degree to which people form belief changes, as a result of their emotions, differs for people from different cultures. For instance, when asked to recall how they had reacted when harmed by another person, Turkish and Surinamese respondents in a study by Mesquita (in preparation) reported that their confidence in and respect for the other person had changed, and they did so to a significantly higher degree than the Dutch respondents. They also reported that it had tended to change their confidence in other people generally, whereas the Dutch subjects reported not to

have undergone that change. In principle, the consequences of such belief changes can be pervasive, because they may serve as a frame of interpretation for subsequent events, and thus, influence the emotional appraisals of later events.

Conclusion

As has become painfully obvious in this chapter, the study of emotion in cultural context suffers from flagrant neglect by the research community at large, and from methodological insufficiency. Another pressing issue is the uncertain status of the concept of "culture." The large majority of psychological studies reported in this chapter has simply compared different countries, or more exactly, often a specific group of the population (mostly students) in one of the major urban centers. Anthropologists, on the other hand, have tended to study rural populations in remote areas of the world. Not surprisingly, the data are hardly comparable. As pointed out before, major subcultural differences, such as urban–rural, age or cohort differences, social class differences, and exposure to media have not been taken into consideration.

Universal Aspects of Emotion

The main conclusion from the the available evidence is that emotions exist in all cultures, regardless of the presence or absence of the corresponding linguistic notions (cf. Russell, 1991). Cross-culturally, events considered relevant to major concerns are seen to elicit emotional responses, including facial expressions, physiological changes, hedonic experiences, and important shifts in the control of behavior pertinent to interactions with the environment.

Also, particular combinations of emotional appraisal and impulse appear to exist in most, if not all, cultures. In most cultures, individuals are emotionally sensitive to contingencies such as loss of intimates, thwarting of strivings by others, arriving at goals after difficulties, danger of rejection by the group or by valued group members; across cultures the response to such contingencies include loss of interest in the outer world and crying, hostile tendencies, enhanced activity and seeking contact with others, and submissive or hostile behavior.

Cross-Cultural Differences in Emotion

There is evidence of consistent cultural differences as well as similarities in each component of emotions. The first rule seems to be that cross-cultural similarities in emotional phenomena are more likely to be found when these phenomena are described at a rather high level of abstraction. An emphasis on the concrete features of emotional phenomena, on the other hand, appears to enhance the likelihood of finding cultural differences. The second rule concerns the emphasis on potential as opposed to practice. Research focusing on emotional potential is more

likely to document cultural similarities, while research emphasizing the practice of certain emotional phenomena is bound to yield differences. Cultures may differ significantly in the frequency and focality of various appraisal features or behavior tendency response types, and other aspects of the role of the corresponding emotional phenomena and linguistic emotion categories in the culture. Thus, people from different cultures appear to be similar in their emotion potential, especially when this potential is described at a higher level of meaning. Yet, despite the similarities in basic elements of emotional life, concrete emotional realities in different cultures may vary widely.

Cultures may differ with respect to the ways meaning gets expressed, filled in, and elaborated. The kinds of events that correspond to certain appraisal contingencies may vary greatly, and the same types of events may engender drastically different appraisals. Both the presence and the specific nature of the behavior corresponding to various tendencies can be drastically different from one culture to the other. Similarity in repertoire thus does not seem to preclude differences in the actual emotional lives of people in different cultures. Also, all the contingencies that engender emotions are not easily grouped under the contingencies that make a claim to universality.

While the presently available evidence of cultural differences in the potential for emotional phenomena is at best to be called modest, hardly any systematic information is available on emotion ecology, the way and the degree to which emotion potential is transformed into emotion practice in various cultures.

The Influence of Culture on Emotion

Very little is known, too, on the ways cultures influence the emotional lives of their members. Almost no systematic information exists on cultural differences in the social manifestations and social consequences of emotions, and the reciprocal influences upon the emotions themselves. There is growing consensus that cultures may shape the emotional lives of their members at different levels (Markus & Kitayama, 1994a; Mesquita, in preparation; Shweder, 1993). For these reasons, it should be acknowledged simultaneously that certain socially and individually important emotional response types are universal or near-universal, and that the experience, phenomenology, and social role of these response types may be different in essential regards. Even where universal patterns of appraisal and response exist, these universal cores may be submerged in the culturally determined contexts of experience, meaning, and social interaction. However, data have to be collected that pinpoint the place of universal mechanisms in the patterns, and that include the interactional significance of emotions in particular cultures.

Methodology

These conclusions are reached, in part, through the paradigm shift in the cross-cultural psychology of emotion. The research methodology has changed accord-

ingly. Studies have begun to focus on different components of emotions simultaneously. It is no longer assumed that cross-cultural similarities found in one emotion component, such as facial expressions or overall appraisal patterns, imply similarity in other facets of emotion. Whether cross-cultural similarities in one component exist along with either differences or similarities in other components has become an empirical question. When "the same" emotion is studied in different cultures—that is, when the emotion labels used can be considered each other's translation with respect to certain major components—similarities and differences in the emotional phenomena associated with these labels are investigated for each component of the emotion process separately. For this reason, there has been a tendency to move away from emotion words as the basis of comparison.

The move away from emotion words has led to new methodological developments that can be expected to expand in the near future. In particular, additional recent studies of emotion have focused on the cross-cultural comparison of emotional responses to phenomena known to be relevant to all cultures of comparison (e.g., Haidt & Keltner, 1995; Mesquita, in preparation). Although the phenomena concentrated on may not be the most prevalent ones overall, this approach provides a better guarantee than the previous ones that the phenomena under study have at least some relevance to all cultural groups included for comparison.

Another novel strategy in the psychological cross-cultural studies on emotions has been to examine the most salient emotional phenomena in each culture, regardless of whether the salient phenomena in different cultures overlap. An example was provided by Markus and Kitayama's (1991) study of Japanese emotion words. Rather than selecting those words that were the closest translations of English emotion words, they chose to study words that were salient in the Japanese culture. Analogously, one may focus on the most frequent emotion antecedent in different cultures, regardless of the overlap between the cultures of comparison. This strategy offers the advantage that information can be obtained about the most important emotional phenomena in different cultures. The disadvantage of such a strategy clearly is that the most prevalent emotional phenomena in different cultures may not overlap. This type of research would, therefore, focus on different emotions for each culture, rendering comparison at the level of individual emotions more difficult.

A More Comprehensive Perspective on Cultural Variation in Emotions

Although our discussion has certainly given an impression of the range of cultural variations in emotions, it probably does not give a full account of the differences that do, in fact, exist. Such a full account can, in our view, only be obtained when the process character of emotions receives the attention it deserves. Emotion as process, as hinted at earlier, has several aspects. First, the different components of emotions are not independent. Differences found to occur in one component probably tend to bring along differences in the other components. For instance, a cultural tendency to blame other people for unpleasant events may well be found

to co-occur with a propensity to aggressive behavior (see e.g., Cohen & Nisbett, 1994).

Second, emotions are multilayered processes, because the emotional response to an event is in itself a significant event to be appraised emotionally (Ellsworth, 1994; Fischer, 1991). Thus, the initial appraisal of the event may be modified by a secondary appraisal, focusing on the emotional response elicited by the event. Cultural differences in the development of the emotion process may thus be due to differences in secondary appraisal. There is evidence that cultures vary in their beliefs about which emotions are most significant or revealing, which emotions are good or bad, and which emotions are appropriate to particular social roles or social settings (Briggs, 1970; Ellsworth, 1994; Gerber, 1985; Markus & Kitayama, 1994a; White, 1990, 1994). These cultural differences in the meaning attached to emotions (or certain emotional responses) themselves may bring about cultural variations in secondary appraisals, and may thus produce differences in the course of emotions.

Third, emotions as such, or the behaviors following from the emotions, may affect the environment, thus changing the situation by which the emotions were elicited in the first place. Emotions, in other words, represent transactions with the environment (Lazarus, 1991). An appraisal of the situation as changed may override or modify the original appraisal. Thus, situational changes brought about by the emotional response feed back into the emotion process. Many emotions emerge in social interactions, which may change, not only as an effect of instrumental action, but also because other people understand and act upon the signal value or meaning of emotion or emotional behavior (Frijda & Mesquita, 1991; 1994). On the grounds that both signal value and meaning of emotions and emotional behaviors appear to be variable across cultures, cultural differences in the course of emotion may be expected, and this holds the more empathically if emotional interactions, rather than only the emotional phenomena within one individual, are studied.

Finally, the process character of emotions appears rather clearly in that emotions have cognitive consequences, such as belief changes. Various cognitive consequences may well cause cultural differences in emotional inclinations to be amplified. As we saw in the section on cognitive consequences, strategies of cognitive processing appear to vary with moods, and even with emotional states, for the duration of such states. Anger, for example, leads people to understand their environment in terms of agency; the appraisal of human agency is likely to be facilitated by a bias towards the perception of agency. Cultural differences in the tendency for anger may thus reinforce themselves. Whereas cultures with a high incidence of anger will tend to perceive agency, and thus, be likely to develop more anger, cultures with a low incidence of anger will not perceive the world in terms of agency, and therefore, be less inclined to anger. More permanent belief changes will also feed back into the emotions. Belief changes will lead to certain emotional sensitivities. Thus, cultural differences in the tendencies to develop (certain types of) belief changes are likely to lead to cultural variations in the sensitivities for (particular types of) events. All this, quite obviously, is subject matter for future research endeavors.

In all, there is ample reason to assume that cultural differences in emotions will be more pronounced (a) when the different components of emotion are studied in their temporal and functional relation, (b) when attention is focused on the way the meaning and social effects of emotions feed back into the emotion process, and (c) when the focus of research will be shifted from individual emotions to emotion ecologies, and factors that influence cultural differences in emotion ecologies. The field has only begun to address these issues empirically.

Endnotes

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2. A analogous distinction between maximal and typical performance has been made by Lonner & Berry (1986, p. 105).

3. The distinction between availability and accessibility of concepts is borrowed from the social cognition paradigm (see e.g., Wyer & Srull, 1981, 1986).

4. We combine closely related models as described in Markus & Kitayama (1994) and in Frijda & Mesquita (1994), Markus & Kitayama speak of "core cultural ideas," and Frijda & Mesquita use the term "focal concerns." There is enough overlap between those concepts to use them interchangeably, which we will do in the following.

5. To our knowledge, the value literature does not elaborate on the way values are materialized in, or even derived from, cultural practice; nor does it make clear how value priorities shape other psychological practices such as emotions. It may well be that the two literatures end up converging.

6. Self-esteem has often been treated as a dimension of appraisal. We think it is more accurate to represent it as a concern.

7. See e.g., Clore, Schwarz, & Conway (1994) for various theoretical explanations of the emergence of emotion- and mood-specific cognitive processing.

8. There is not much clarity about the mechanisms that may underly the formation of belief changes, but see Frijda et al. (1991).

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